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COLLABORATIVE ECONOMY, TOURIST ACCOMMODATION AND 
THEIR IMPACT IN THE CONTEXT OF SUSTAINABLE URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT: IS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE A POSSIBLE 
ANSWER?1 
Dr. Juli Ponce Solé2 
 
1. THE COLLABORATIVE ECONOMY (CE): IN PARTICULAR, TOURIST APARTMENTS 
2. THE NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OF THE CE AND THEIR IMPACT ON SIGNIFICANT 
PUBLIC INTERESTS 
3. PUBLIC INTERVENTION AND CE REGULATION IN THE ACCOMMODATION SECTOR: 
THE SHORTCOMINGS AND LIMITS OF REPUTATIONAL MECHANISMS 
4. HOW TO REGULATE: PRINCIPLES OF GOOD REGULATION AND BETTER OR SMART 
REGULATION FOR THE CE AND ACCOMMODATION 
5. THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF REGULATION OPEN TO THE CE IN THE ACCOMMODATION 
SECTOR IN SPAIN 
6. REGULATION AND FLEXIBILITY. IS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE A POSSIBLE ANSWER? 
FUTURE POSSIBILITIES FOR ALGORITHMIC REGULATION AND THE NIRVANA FALLACY. 
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
It is a pleasure to join the second Festschrift in honour of Julian Conrad 
Juergensmeyer, Professor and Ben F. Johnson, Jr. Chair in Law at Georgia State 
University College of Law, and Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Comparative 
Urban Law and Policy, who has announced his retirement on June 30, 2020, after 
55 years of teaching law.  
 
1 This study forms part of the research project entitled “Democratic regeneration, good 
administration and public integrity: the role of administrative law in the face of the crisis of public 
institutions” (DER2014-57391-C2-1-R), lead researcher: Juli Ponce.  
2 Dr. Juli Ponce Solé, Professor of Administrative Law, University of Barcelona. TransJus 
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I had also the honor of participating in the previous Festchrift, which 
commemorated his 45th year of Law teaching in 2010, with an article included 
entitled A 2020 VIEW OF URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE: A FESTSCHRIFT 
SYMPOSIUM IN HONOR OF JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER Fall 
2010/winter 2011, volume 42, Number 4/Volume 43, Number.3  
Now, changing the topic, I will deal with a comparative view of current urban law 
and policy issues related to tourist apartments and their impact on cities and 
affordable housing in an international and comparative context. Although I 
consider different countries, I will take as a case study the situation in a specific 
European country, Spain, with several references to a city that has developed 
regulations to address the problem: Barcelona. 
First, I will consider the so-called collaborative Economy (CE) in relation to tourist 
apartments and cities. Then, I will consider the negative externalities of the CE and 
their impact on significant urban public interests. Thirdly, I will study the possible 
public intervention and CE regulation in the accommodation sector, focusing on 
the shortcomings and limits of reputational mechanisms. After that, I will suggest 
ideas for regulating those issues, in accordance with the principles of good 
regulation in the framework of the international movement, which goes beyond 
urban issues, including the so-called better or smart regulation. Finally, I will focus 
on the possible different types of regulation of CE, introducing some final 
reflections about the possible role of artificial intelligence and algorithmic 
regulation in the future. 
1. THE COLLABORATIVE ECONOMY: IN PARTICULAR, TOURIST APARTMENTS4 
The collaborative economy (henceforth CE) is the expression that will be used here 
to refer to what is also known as the sharing economy, peer-to-peer economy, mesh 
or collaborative consumption5.  As is well known, it is essentially a question of 
economic possibilities that are opened up by the information technology (IT) in 
existence, which encourages the increased sharing of certain goods (among them 
 
3 “Affordable Housing as Urban Infrastructure: A Comparative Study from a European 
Perspective” (pp. 223-245) 
4 This study focuses on tourist apartments in the large cities rather than tourist chalets and 
apartments in coastal and island resorts which can have a different sort of problems and solutions. 
5 On the range of names applied and their differences, see EU, RANCHORDAS, 2016 
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being what most interests us here, namely accommodation6) and a growth in the 
division between the ownership and use of property.7  
IT progress (which implies a reduction in transaction costs and in the information 
asymmetry between the parties involved) and the economic crisis (leading to 
citizens’ increased interest in new opportunities for obtaining income) explain the 
expansion of these forms of economy. In particular, the first factor means that it is 
possible to substantially reduce the costs of obtaining, storing, processing and 
communicating the information needed to identify, locate, establish contact with 
and put in touch large numbers of people interested in mutually beneficial 
agreements that may have a positive effect on the city as a whole; among other 
examples of this phenomenon may be included, as the European Parliament points 
out: the generation of business opportunities for expansion and employment;  the 
promotion of the cultural, free-time and leisure activity sectors; the international 
recognition of cities; the more efficient and sustainable use of existing resources, 
or giving consumers greater power.8  
However, the European Parliament has also pointed out that several negative 
consequences may also exist, in the face of which it “notes that there is ample room 
for manoeuvre for national, regional and local authorities to adopt context-specific 
measures in order to address clearly identified public interest objectives with 
proportionate measures fully in line with EU legislation; calls on the Commission 
therefore to support the Member States in their policy-making and in adopting rules 
consistent with EU law.” 
This paper will be specifically concerned with the collaborative economy with 
regard to tourist accommodation, where the above-mentioned professional model 
has made considerable inroads in the context of the use of dwellings for tourist 
accommodation; this trend is currently reaching remarkable levels, including the 
participation of real estate investment funds attracted by the sector’s high 
 
6 Such as, for example, the well-known Airbnb platform:   https://www.airbnb.cat/     
7 The literature on the CE is already considerable. Apart from the works that will be referred to in 
the course of this paper, in Spanish, see, for example, DOMÈNECH, G. “Economía colaborativa y 
Administración local”, Anuario del Gobierno local, 2015/16, pp. 35 et seq., and “La regulación de 
la economía colaborativa (el caso “Úber contra el taxi”)”, Revista Cefelegal, núms. 175-176 
(agosto-septiembre de 2015), pp. 61 et seq., and LORA TAMAYO, M., “Economía colaborativa y 
alojamiento”, pp. 283 et seq. in La regulación de la economía colaborativa: Airbnb, Blablacar, 
Uber y otras plataformas. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2017. 
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profitability. Thus, in Madrid, half the tourist apartments are controlled by 
investment funds.9  
In the same way, the original idea of renting out housing while the owner was away 
has given way to the revival of the age-old institution of sub-tenants, in a context 
of economic crisis, as a simple means of making ends meet on the part of the owner 
or as a way to pay the mortgage.10 
In addition, the question of tourist apartments should be understood in the 
framework of tourism, which might be called Spain’s leading industry, on which 
more than 11% of the GDP relies, contributing 110,000 M euros to the economy.11 
It is therefore a difficult undertaking to consider the challenge of tourist housing 
adequately since it affects a wide range of both private and public interests and, 
ultimately, society as a whole. 
2. THE NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OF THE CE AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC INTERESTS 
However, apart from advantages, the CE may also involve, as has already been 
mentioned, many negative externalities that affect the well-being not only of those 
taking part in the collaboration, but also of third parties (neighbours, the inhabitants 
of the cities) and, ultimately, society as a whole.12 As is widely known, in the case 
of tourist apartments (henceforth TAs), that is, short-term rentals, such negative 
externalities or, to use language that is no longer related to the field of economics 
but rather juridical in nature, these serious impacts on matters of public interest can 
be classified under different headings: 
- Inconvenience and disturbances for established residents caused by the 
short-term users of these apartments and for the city as a whole, including 
its public spaces, which become overcrowded as a consequence of the 
tourists staying in short-term rental apartments. This is logical in a city such 
 
9 According to a report by Madrid City Council, which is reported on here: 
http://cadenaser.com/emisora/2017/05/05/radio_madrid/1493982867_637484.html  
10 Article in The Guardian, “The reluctant Airbnb host: why I rent my spare bedroom to pay my 
own rent”, 1st August 2017. Article in El País: “Los usuarios de Airbnb cambian la esencia de la 
plataforma”, 2nd August 2017, which pointed out that fewer than 25% of landlords in Spain use 
Airbnb in accordance with the original model. 47% of users of the platform in Madrid do so in 
order to obtain additional income that enables them to make ends meet. 
11 El País,  “Qué hacer con la primera industria de España?”, 2nd August 2017. 
12 Hence the need for their regulation, as will be seen below. 
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as Barcelona, which receives some 19 million tourists per year who spend 
a few days there.  
- Unfair competition for the hotel sector. 
- Non-payment of the corresponding taxes, since they operate illegally and 
clandestinely. 
- The lack of security in these apartments arising from the use to which they 
are put, as well as risks for public health, noise, and the lack of privacy. 
- The decline in the offer of long-term affordable housing for those in need 
of a place to live, since owners prefer to market these properties as tourist 
apartments because of the higher financial returns. 
- The gentrification of certain urban districts and, in general, urban 
imbalances caused by what has been dubbed touristification,13 including the 
intensive use of urban public spaces. 
- Changes to shops in the vicinity, associated with changes in the inhabitants, 
with a consequent loss of local retailers to satisfy the needs of permanent 
residents.   
- Problems of mobility.14 
- Pressure on the real estate market, which makes housing prices in the city 
in general increase. Although this is an aspect that is sometimes disputed, 
the currently available objective data support the validity of this 
conclusion.15 
 
13 Article in the newspaper Público: “Los pisos turísticos devoran la ciudad: consecuencias del 
“efecto Airbnb”, 10th April 2017: http://www.publico.es/sociedad/turistificacion-pisos-turisticos-
devoran-ciudad.html  
14 In the case of Barcelona, see the report by the city’s Síndica de Greuges (Ombudsman service) 
“Referent a l’actuació d’ofici de referència en matèria de turisme i el seu impacte en la qualitat de 
vida del veïnat de Barcelona” dated 12th June 2015, referring to these impacts. 
15 For the case of Amsterdam, see the study by the University of Amsterdam by VAN DER BIJL, 
V., “The effect of Airbnb on House prices in Amsterdam”, consultable at: https://vastgoedkennis-
data.vakliteratuur.info/Server/getfile.aspx?file=docs/publicaties/site/UVA/Bijl_VM.pdf . For the 
case of 100 cities in North America, see the following study made available in Spanish by CityLab 
in August 2017: “Nuevas investigaciones muestran que Airbnb sí contribuye al aumento de los 
alquileres. Un análisis preliminar de 100 áreas metropolitanas sugiere esta empresa sería uno de 
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Such impacts on overall urban general interests, these negative externalities 
(gentrification, the reduction in the long-term housing offer and the increase in its 
price, with the consequences as regards its accessibility, commercial changes, the 
impact on the use of public spaces …) are often omitted in studies drawn up from 
the point of view of competition by, for example, the CNMC (Comisión Nacional 
de los Mercados y la Competencia; in English, the National Commission on 
Markets and Competition) and in doctrinal analyses. The overall consequences of 
thousands of micro-decisions, which SCHELLING refers to from the point of view 
of Economics,16 which generate market failures that are potentially detrimental to 
the standard of living of people in these urban spaces, are not taken into account for 
the general public interest.17 
The effect of these negative impacts on people’s rights exercised in the urban space 
(the right to housing, the right to environment …) and on the increasingly 
consolidated right to the city, included in international texts such as the recent New 
Urban Agenda (adopted at the United Nations Conference on Housing and 
Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) in Quito) or the European Charter for 
the Safeguarding of Human Rights in the City,18 signed by several Spanish cities, 
tends to be forgotten. This right to the city, currently undergoing juridical 
definition,19  is linked with a further powerful idea for urban management and 
innovation in the field of law: the idea that the city, in itself, is common, recalling 
Elionor Ostrom´s works, that is, a common good, subject to competition for its use, 
which may lead to tragedies that affect the weakest more seriously. Hence, the 
importance of regulations to avoid them.20 
From a social, environmental and economic point of view, this right to the city is 
rooted in and linked with the juridical principle of sustainable urban and regional 
development, a principle explicitly recognised by Spanish legislation (at the state 
 
16 SCHELLING, Micromotivos y macroconducta (1989), Fondo de Cultura Económica, México. 
17 PONCE SOLÉ, J.” Urbanisme, barris, dret a la ciutat: volem una societat (in)justa, (in)decent, 
(in)segura, (in)sostenible?”, Nous Horitzons, Nº. 195, 2009 (issue devoted to: El barris invisibles), 
pp. 12-25, available online at: 
http://www.noushoritzons.cat/ca/file/139211/download?token=iXyvLa8V 
18 BANDRES, JM. “El derecho  a la ciudad” Cuadernos de derecho local, Número 35, 2014, pp. 
97-103. 
19 For example, PONCE SOLÉ, J., “El dret a la ciutat i els drets en la ciutat”, Blog de la Revista 
Catalana de Dret Públic, 22 de novembre de 2017, available online at: http://eapc-
rcdp.blog.gencat.cat/2017/11/22/el-dret-a-la-ciutat-i-els-drets-en-la-ciutat-juli-ponce-sole/  
20 FOSTER, S. and IANONE, C., Foster, Sheila and Iaione, Christian, The City as a Commons 
(August 29, 2015). 34 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 281 (2016). Available online at: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2653084 
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level, which can be roughly compared with the U.S. federal level: article 2 et seq. 
of the Texto Refundido estatal de la ley de suelo de 2015; consolidated text of the 
State Land Act of 2015; as well as much regional legislation) and by case law in 
Spain, such as, among many examples, in the Ruling of the Supreme Court of 12th 
July 2017, cassation appeal 1859/2016,  in which the cancellation of a development 
plan was upheld because of the unreasonably high amount of new housing 
envisaged, which had failed to take into account key features for the decision and 
had not justified it adequately, thereby affecting this principle.21 
For the moment, let us simply remember article 3 of the Consolidated text of the 
State Land Act of 2015, mentioned in the ruling discussed above (the italics are 
mine):  
“Article 3. Principle of sustainable urban and regional development. 
1. Public policies related to land regulation, planning, occupation, transformation 
and use have as their common aim the use of this resource in accordance with public 
interest and according to the principle of sustainable development, notwithstanding 
the specific aims attributed to them by the Law. 
2.  By virtue of the principle of sustainable development, the policies referred to in 
the previous paragraph shall promote the rational use of natural resources, 
harmonising the requirements of the economy, employment, social cohesion, equal 
treatment and opportunities, people’s health and safety, and environmental 
protection, contributing in particular to:   
c) The adequate prevention of risks and dangers for public health and safety and 
the effective elimination of any disturbance to either of them. 
3. The public authorities shall draw up and develop, in the urban environment, the 
policies for which they are respectively responsible, in accordance with the 
principles of competitiveness and environmental, social and economic 
sustainability, territorial cohesion, energy efficiency and functional complexity, 
endeavouring to ensure that this environment is adequately endowed, and that land 
is occupied efficiently, combining its uses in a functional way. In particular:  
 
 21 The ruling can be consulted at: 
http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/contenidos.action?action=contentpdf&databasematch=TS&ref
erence=8106572&links=&optimize=20170724&publicinterface=true  
Many others can be found in RAMOS MEDRANO, J.A. “El concepto de urbanismo sostenible del 
Texto Refundido de la ley del suelo en la reciente jurisprudencia”, RDUyMA, núm. 297, 2015, pp. 
105 et seq.  
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a) They shall make possible its residential use in dwellings that constitute primary 
residences in a safe and healthy urban context that is accessible to all, of a suitable 
quality and socially integrated, provided with the infrastructure, services, materials 
and products that eliminate or, when appropriate, minimise, through the application 
of the best technology available on the market at a reasonable price, contaminating 
emissions and greenhouse gases, water and energy consumption, and waste 
production, and improve their management.  
g) They shall integrate as many uses as might be compatible with the residential 
role within the urban fabric in order to contribute to the balance of cities and 
residential areas, favouring the diversity of uses, bringing services, amenities and 
infrastructure closer to the community of residents, as well as social cohesion and 
integration. 
j) They shall evaluate, as appropriate, the perspective of tourism, and shall allow 
and improve responsible use for the purpose of tourism. 
4. The public authorities shall promote the conditions to ensure that the citizens’ 
rights and obligations laid down in the following articles are real and effective, by 
adopting the town and regional planning measures that may be necessary to ensure 
a balanced outcome, favouring or containing, as appropriate, the processes of land 
occupation and transformation.  
Land linked to a residential use by town and regional planning shall guarantee the 
right to enjoy suitable and decent housing in accordance with the terms laid down 
by the legislation on the subject.”    
With regard to the above-mentioned right to the city, the Catalan ombudsman has 
precisely referred to the “right to the city”, understood as the right to dispose of a 
public space where the citizens’ different uses can be accommodated in a balanced 
way together with the citizen’s right to live with as little inconvenience as 
possible.22 
For all the above-mentioned reasons, I will here place special emphasis on the role 
of public regulation in general and, more specifically, as regards town and housing 
planning in the CE in connection with TAs in order to protect the right to the city 
and the juridical principle of sustainable urban development. This includes the case 
of established urban areas as well (see the Rulings of the Supreme Court of 30th 
September 2011 and of 29th March 2012, cassation no. 1294/2008 and 3425/2009, 
 
22 Síndic de Greuges de Catalunya, El derecho a la convivencia, Marzo 2017: 
http://www.sindic.cat/site/unitFiles/4339/Informe%20convivencia%20urbana_castella_def.pdf  
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respectively). For this reason, special attention will be paid to town-planning 
regulations and tourist apartments and houses.  
It should also be taken into account that the progressive professionalization of 
relations through online platforms and the entry into the market of investment funds 
interested in the short-term high returns of TAs may have a noticeable impact on 
the city in the future: at the time of writing these lines, more than half the TAs in 
some large Spanish cities, such as Madrid, are already in the hands of such funds.23 
In other words, and somewhat bluntly: the search for capital gains that made 
Spanish cities “explode outwards” in the prodigious decade prior to the onset of the 
great crisis in 2008 may be repeated along with the wide range of social, economic 
and environmental casualties well-known to us all.  This time, however, the damage 
will be in the heart of the cities, which are liable to be “gutted” and swiftly 
transformed into areas that it will be difficult to sustain socially, environmentally, 
and economically unsustainable areas in the years to come. 
Of course, there is no lack of examples of cities in other countries that have declined 
into a state of decay.  Detroit, a paradigm of the capitalist city, is one example where 
the focus on a primary use (in this case industrial) has led to a critical social and 
economic situation.24 
3. PUBLIC INTERVENTION AND THE REGULATION OF THE CE IN THE 
ACCOMMODATION SECTOR: THE INSUFFICIENCY AND LIMITS OF REPUTATIONAL 
MECHANISMS 
All the reasons presented are both important and of sufficient public interest to 
justify public intervention to regulate TAs. In this respect, I do not share the 
opinions that minimise the negative externalities described above and state them to 
be “less proven and meaningful than the scientifically demonstrated consequences 
of atmospheric pollution.”25 On the one hand, for example, because adequate proof 
 
23 http://cadenaser.com/emisora/2017/05/05/radio_madrid/1493982867_637484.html  




25 RODRÍGUEZ FONT, M., “La regulació de l’allotjament col·laboració a Catalunya: anàlisi de 
les propostes de l´activitat catalana de la competència”, Revista Catalana de Dret Públic, núm. 53, 
desembre 2016, p. 177. The sentences of the civil and criminal chamber of Catalonia’s High Court 
of Justice  that are cited by the author fail to convince me of the decreasing size of negative 
externalities since they are limited to questions that affect a home-owners’ association. As is 
obvious, nothing is said or denied in them as regards the impact that they may produce on other 
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is clearly visible in consequences such as the increase in housing prices or 
gentrification, mentioned above. Be that as it may, although this proof may be 
debatable or considered inconclusive at the moment, the existence of indications 
that are at least solid, such as the ones referred to, should lead us to apply the 
precautionary principle in the social field in order to ensure urban sustainability, 
which would give rise to the public intervention required to guarantee the latter. As 
is pointed out in the Supreme Court Ruling of 7th November 2017, referring to the 
town-planning context and scientific uncertainty and the risks:      
 “…there are data that substantiate that there is no absolute scientific certainty, but 
rather, in contrast, there is evidence that it may come about in future; in the face of 
such situations, the public administration cannot remain impassive and must act 
with the due diligence inherent to the right to good administration.” 
There has recently been a noticeable increase in sensitivity in regards to the impact 
that both public and private activity may have on social cohesion and sustainability. 
Growing awareness about the importance of socially sustainable development, 
together with economic and social development, allow present and future 
generations to improve their capacity to generate well-being. This awareness is 
leading to reflection about the need for a precautionary principle to crystallise 
among us in the social field, in much the same way as the precautionary principle 
has already done so in regards to the environment. This precautionary principle 
with regard to social matters should be accompanied by the establishment of true 
social impact assessments (SIAs), once again comparable to the already well-
established environmental impact assessments, which, however, fail to cover the 
social impact of private activities, as emphasised by FOSTER, who cites several 
rulings by U.S. state courts that have examined public decisions because of the 
failure to take significant social impacts into account in the decision-making 
process. 26  Environmental sustainable development can thus inspire among us 
specific juridical approaches transferrable to the social field, which can trigger a 
realistic assessment of the impact that possible activities are likely to have on the 
collectives that they are going to affect and can enable us to avoid or promote the 
adoption of normative measures to protect public interests if there is no certainty in 
regards to the impact that they may have on social cohesion and sustainability.  
 
general interests linked to the city, such as the ones referred to here (housing price increases, 
gentrification, etc.).  
26 FOSTER, S., “The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban Land Use”, Notre 
Dame Law Review, Vol. 82:2, December 2006, pp. 527 et seq. 
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In this respect, the Spanish Supreme Court Ruling of 5th December 2016, appeal 
number 378/2013, before Judge Suay Rincón, once again points out that the 
obligations of due care or due diligence associated with the right to good 
administration require a certain administrative behaviour in decision-making 
processes (in this specific case the adoption of regulations) in order to guarantee 
social sustainability.27 
In fact, this type of public intervention has been undertaken both abroad (in the 
U.S.28 and in Europe,29 as is shown by the cases of New York or Berlin, with a total 
prohibition of this type of activity,30 but also in Brussels, with a series of qualitative 
requirements that must be fulfilled for a TA to be able to operate) and in Spain. 
 
27 “The evaluation of the social impact contributes to the reassessment of a procedure that cannot 
be understood as a mere formality, insofar as it guarantees the realisation of citizens’ rights.  (…) 
But the progress in the provisions concerning the social and environmental impact brought 
together in Royal Decree  1083/2009 (article 1.2),within the contents of the report on the analysis 
of regulatory impacts in addition to that of its own contents (article 1.1), has taken longer to make 
itself/themselves felt, despite the unambiguous connection, on the one hand, with the concept of 
social sustainability, already included even in the Constitution itself (section 135.4), from which it 
does not seem unreasonable to deduce the need to demand an additional effort of motivation to 
explain the reasons that lead to the adoption of certain regulations that have a negative impact on 
social rights (in this respect, dissenting opinions were expressed to constitutional rulings 49/2015 
and 139/2016), and while in the case of environmental matters case-law has come to enshrine the 
requirement to put forward a reinforced motive to support the adoption of a retrogressive measure 
on the basis of the environmental principle of non-retrogression – Rulings of 13 June 2011 RC 
4045/2009, 30 September of 2011 RC 1294/2008, and of 29 March 2012 RC 3425/2009- as a 
consequence, in turn, of the principle of environmental sustainability, it does not seem that the 
precautionary principle can imply lesser requirements as regards social questions; and, on the 
other hand, as regards the right to good administration, contemplated in article 41 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which in its roots also contains the requirement to 
observe a duty of care in decision-making with the due consideration of all the interests involved 
and the significant facts; and this must be duly reflected in the report analysing the regulatory 
impact. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that, in addition to the subsequent coming into force of the legal 
texts that now constitute the normative frame of reference (Laws 39 and 40/2015) in the 
aforementioned terms …”  
28 White paper Realtor, 2011, which contains good practices recorded in a large number of U.S. 
municipalities https://www.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/reports/2011/short-term-rental-housing-
restrictions-white-paper-2011-09.pdf  
29 UE, Ranchordas, 2016: 
http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/16950/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native  
30 See, for example, the study “Identificación de mejores prácticas internacionales en la regulación 
de la oferta de vivienda particular para uso turístico”, drawn up by CEAT (Confederación 
española de hoteles  y alojamientos turísticos). Available online at:  
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In fact, at a legal level, from the perspective of tourism, it is well known that State 
Act 4/2013 added a paragraph e) to article 5 of the Spanish Urban Rental Act (Ley 
de Arrendamientos Urbanos – LAU), excluding TAs from its scope, as long as 
specific sectorial regulations were in existence, a situation that, for example, arises 
in Catalonia, the autonomous community that will be taken as an example for 
reference purposes, with the regulation introduced in 2002 in the Tourism Act for 
Catalonia (art. 50, with regard to tourist accommodation companies), and 
subsequently developed by Decree 59/2012, of 20th November, concerning tourist 
accommodation establishments and tourist apartments. 
This regulation required, in a first stage, prior notification to be able to exercise any 
TA activity, a requirement that was subsequently replaced by a responsible 
declaration (the current article 50 of the Act, modified in 201731), in addition to 
registration in a specific administrative Register and a series of technical requisites 
(articles 65 et seq. of the Decree).  
From the standpoint of housing and town-planning, and making use of the Catalan 
example in this case once again, in 2007 the Catalan Act on the right to housing 
(LDHC) added a brief reference to TAs in articles 3 and 19, which after a 
modification in 2011 became known as dwellings with economic activities 
(viviendas con actividades económicas). 32 In turn, the town-planning legislation in 
force in Catalonia foresees no specific requirements in regards to this type of 
dwelling, with the exception of a brief reference added in 2015 with regard to non-
developable land,33  although article 68.6 of Decree 159/2012 mentioned above 
reminds one that: 
 
http://www.ithotelero.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/identificacionbuenaspracticasinternacionalesoctubre2013.pdf    
In Berlin, for example, “specifically in the district of Pankow, it is forbidden to let private 
dwellings for tourist stays of fewer than 28 days, for two main reasons: to prevent increases in 
housing prices for residents and to avoid the nuisance and discomforts caused by tourists to local 
residents.” In the USA, “… and more specifically in San Francisco, letting a dwelling to tourists or 
for short-term stays of fewer than 32 days is totally prohibited. In New York, the situation is 
similar to that in San Francisco, but the ban concerning rentals occurs when these last fewer than 
30 consecutive days”. 
31 LAW 5/2017, of 28th March, on fiscal, administrative, finance and public sector measures, and 
on the creation and regulation of taxes on shopping centre, on stays in tourist accommodation, on 
radiotoxic elements, on bottled sugar-sweetened beverages and on carbon-dioxide emissions.  
32 Art. 155 of Law 9/2011, of 29 December, on the promotion of economic activity.  
33 Art. 47, 8 bis, introduced by Law 3/2015, of 11th March: “Dwellings for use by tourists are 
compatible with the legally established use of family housing.” 
540




 “It is not possible to make use of a dwelling for the purposes of tourism if this is 
prohibited by the regulation of uses in the area where it is located or it is prohibited 
by the statutes of the community duly registered in the Property Register in 
buildings subject to the Horizontal property regime.”   
Even so, the Town-planning law in force in Catalonia, modified in 201534, states in 
article 9.8 that: 
“Town-planning regulations and ordinances concerning the building and use of 
land cannot establish constraints on land use that involve restrictions as regards the 
access to or exercise of economic activities that violate the principles and requisites 
established by the Services Directive. The overriding reasons relating to the public 
interest that, in agreement with the same Services Directive, may allow an 
exception to the application to be made shall be established by regulation. These 
restrictions shall conform to the principles of necessity, proportionality and non-
discrimination and be appropriately justified in the project memorandum taking 
into account the remaining public interests considered in the plan.”  
At present, as is well known, the City Council of Barcelona - a large city that is 
particularly active in this field- after the suspension of the prior notification of the 
commencement of activities involving the establishment and/or expansion of TAs 
in certain areas, in force since 2014 and completed by other subsequent regulations 
that broadened its scope – has passed a Special Town-planning regulation on 
Tourist apartments (PEUAT), which came into force in March 2017.35 
Within the existing legal framework, what options do public authorities have to 
protect public interests affected by tourist apartments?  
The first question that has to be answered is whether or not it is a good idea to 
contemplate a specific regulation or if it can be dispensed with. Although answering 
this question is basically a matter of political concern, the reply cannot ignore the 
existing legal framework, which imposes active obligations on public 
administrations and which therefore, as will be seen, makes such a regulation 
necessary in order to protect the public interest. 
The converse possibility of not establishing any regulation would be to understand 
that the reputational mechanisms generated by the platforms themselves are 
 
34 Law 16/2015, of 21st July, on the simplification of the economic activity of the Administration 
of the Generalitat and local government bodies in Catalonia and the promotion of economic 
activity. 
35 See: http://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/pla-allotjaments-turistics/es/  
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sufficient to guarantee the public interests at risk. Hence, the CNMC (the National 
Commission on Markets and Competition) went so far as to sustain in its 
provisional document of March 2016 in regards to the public regulation of 
minimum requisites and fixtures and fittings that: 
 “Originally, the justification for these restrictions lay in the existence of 
asymmetric information between the owners of the accommodation (who were 
aware of all its features) and the users (who lacked this information). Furthermore, 
without Internet and the new platforms’ systems of reputation, there were 
substantial costs involved in searching for information, which were offset by a 
system of public certification. In such a context, the need for a degree of regulation 
to indicate the quality and the characteristics of the accommodation could be 
justified on certain occasions. For example, at the time, the existence of asymmetric 
information could have been the justification for the need to regulate hotel ranking 
by stars from the outset. The number of stars (to a maximum of five) indicated the 
quality and the features of the accommodation, thereby reducing the search costs 
and guiding the consumer as regards the services that he or she might expect to find 
in the establishment. 
Nowadays, however, online information systems and accommodation 
commercialisation platforms include a series of characteristics that offer 
sufficiently believable information to the users who might rent these properties and 
substantially reduce the search costs for them, without the intervention of public 
resources. The platforms enable them to find out the real characteristics of the 
accommodation, its location, and to compare it with other similar establishments, 
etc. 
Similarly, previous users’ ratings of the same accommodation offer potential users 
increasingly refined information on the establishment’s quality and features, its 
fixtures and fittings, and, where appropriate, the host. Following on from the 
previous example, the development of platforms and portals that facilitate this 
information has reduced or even eliminated the asymmetric information between 
the two parties: users seeking accommodation have at their disposal a large 
amount of information at a very low cost.”  
In my opinion, this statement is simplistic and fails to take into account the defects 
and limitations of reputational mechanisms in reality, as is emphasised by several 
studies, such as that carried out by the UK Competition & Market Authority in 2016, 
and doctrinal analyses (see Ranchordas, 2016). This set of empirical analyses and 
studies reveals that:  
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- Reputational mechanisms built on the basis of guests’ opinions fail to take 
into account such aspects as safety, fire risks or negative effects on third 
parties as they focus on certain aspects, of an aesthetic nature, for instance, 
and they are carried out by individuals with no specialised knowledge of 
these subjects. 
- In addition to being restricted in scope, they are unreliable, because there is 
a tendency to offer favourable opinions on the accommodation, in view of 
the fact that negative ones may affect the users themselves unfavourably as 
guests; for this reason, the majority of reviews tend to be positive, but 
incomplete and cautious.   
- Both reviewers and reviewees offer written communications that do not 
provide additional information based on non-verbal communication, such 
as posture and intonation; they are expected to provide written comments 
that match a certain network of users if they hope to continue using the 
platform.  
- A large number of comments are unreliable, inexact, false, incomplete or 
useless.  
In brief, self-regulation, even if it were to be supported by serious and stringent 
reputational instruments, which as has been seen is not the case, would be unable 
to cover the full range of public interests and the negative externalities that public 
regulation endeavours to correct, such as, for example, safety, health, fire risks, 
traffic, nuisance to third parties, impact on the nature of the district and of the city, 
etc.   
In this respect, in view of the considerable public interests involved and the failures 
of reputational mechanisms, what is known as the baseline scenario option (not 
doing anything, not regulating) does not seem to be acceptable in a social and 
democratic state of law. 
The ruling of the High Court of Justice of the Canary Islands of 21st March 2017, 
in the light of the objection to Decree 113/2015, of 22nd May, as a result of which 
the Regulation of Vacation dwellings in the Autonomous Community of the Canary 
Islands was passed, dismissed the case presented by the Spanish Federation of 
Holiday Rentals Associations (FEVITUR) and the National Commission on 
Markets and Competition (CNMC) with regard to the minimum fixtures and fittings 
in holiday rentals, inasmuch as: 
 “The objection to article 10 (minimum fixtures and fittings) is justified insofar as 
the user’s freedom to opt for more basic services that can be offered at a lower price 
is being restricted. However, the requirement of a minimum standard of quality in 
a product that should be classified as touristic cannot be understood to encroach 
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upon entrepreneurial freedom. This refers to fixtures and fittings that are usually 
found in a dwelling, and which are associated with the product offered, 
notwithstanding that some aspects of the regulation may be considered to have been 
excessively detailed, but this cannot be seen as an effective barrier to the free 
exercise of the activity.” 
In addition, we might insist on the need to protect the right to the urban environment, 
what is known in the terminology more commonly used nowadays as the above-
mentioned right to the city of residents in these municipalities. It includes the 
protection of citizens’ rights in the urban space.  For example, it is important to 
consider the impact that noise has on the right to intimacy, as has been pointed out 
by the Spanish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights in 
their case law;  the right to housing, which is harmed by TAs’ tendency to reduce 
the amount of accessible housing available and their effect on urban balances and 
the type of shops;  residents’ right to physical integrity, which may be endangered 
by fires or other incidents, as well as the contribution of all concerned to public 
expenditure (section 31 of the Spanish Constitution); and finally the possible 
impact on the image of the city. All these problems require public intervention in 
order to correct the inefficiencies, the market failures that generate negative 
externalities.  
As the CNMC itself points out in its document of 2016, when it differentiates the 
positive externalities from the negative ones:36  
“In contrast, a negative externality represents a cost for third-parties not considered 
in the price. The clearest example of negative externality is the case of 
environmental pollution caused by gas emissions, with negative consequences for 
society as a whole.  
 
36 “The second group of possible market anomalies is the existence of externalities, which result 
in not all the effects derived from production or consumption being directly reflected in the market 
price as there are economic costs or profits that are not internalised and, therefore, they are not 
reflected in market prices, in such a way that said prices do not reflect the social value of goods. 
Externalities can be positive or negative. When the effect represents a benefit not foreseen in the 
price, it is a positive externality, such as, for example, those that are derived from private research 
and innovation which, in addition to the direct profit that the company obtains, generate a clear 
public benefit. However, without public intervention (for instance, by means of a legal system of 
patents), this work would not be undertaken or less than the optimum amount would be carried 
out”, CNVM, CONCLUSIONES PRELIMINARES SOBRE LOS NUEVOS MODELOS DE 
PRESTACIÓN DE SERVICIOS Y LA ECONOMÍA COLABORATIVA, March 2016 
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For this reason, this type of situation usually requires an incentive /correction by 
means of the establishment of taxes/the provision of subsidies for correction 
purposes, the creation of property rights markets, or by means of regulation, in 
order to achieve the socially desirable level.” 
In view of the public interests at stake, and the wide range of negative externalities 
presented above, internationalisation by means of prices (through taxation) would 
seem to be insufficient. In this respect, and reflecting its disagreement with the 
CNMC, the Catalan Competition Authority (ACCO) has pointed out that:  
“In order to promote respect for these principles - an essential task in the field of 
promoting competition – the ACCO has analysed, as did the National Commission 
on Markets and Competition (CNMC), what the most suitable tools to limit the 
externalities that arise from this activity might be. More specifically, the CNMC 
considers that the best way would consist of Pigovian taxes. Nevertheless, this 
solution would present the following problems at least: 
- It is difficult to define the tax that will result in the desirable level of activity. 
- It does not permit a zero-growth rate for the activity to be attained (there 
will always be someone that is willing and able to pay to stay in a particular 
district).  
- It discriminates in favour of visitors with greater purchasing power, a 
circumstance that could even aggravate some of the negative externalities 
presented (e.g. pressure on price levels).  
- A different tax for the same activity depending on the district also 
constitutes something of an innovation.  
- It is a tool that might already be in use but, for the moment at least, it does 
not seem to have been sufficient.”37 
In addition, as this body points out, it should be kept in mind that regulation can 
suppose a constraint on the offer, whereas the tax only has an impact on demand. 
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In this respect, therefore, the application of taxation as a way of internalising 
negative externalities seems to be insufficient in this sector, for the reasons 
expounded and ACCO’s reasoning.38  
Moreover, in this specific case of the right to the city and the values involved, the 
Pigovian solution is of no use for protecting the delicate public interests involved.39  
If a legal person taking part in the market (an owner) or a short-term rental company 
(or tourist apartment letting company) creates impacts that affect third parties (the 
residents in the apartment blocks where the TAs are located, who suffer noise; 
inhabitants in the city, who encounter higher rents or are unable to find local shops, 
which disappear, etc.), and the latter have to pay high prices for housing and 
products or are directly forced to leave the city, would we be in a similar situation? 
Would we solve the negative externalities (to use economic terminology) or the 
serious impact on questions of general interest (public order; the right to housing, 
the urban environment, segregation …) by means of a tax that those who trade in 
TAs would pay and which would have repercussions as regards the rents at which 
they are let? 
I consider that we have good reasons to doubt whether this would be the case. 
Consequently, it would seem that other measures of intervention will have to be 
designed to correct these market failures and protect public interest. This will be 
the subject that I will reflect on below. 
On the other hand, the solution that involves establishing a market for transferring 
rental rights presents several problems of complexity and efficiency that will be 
discussed in the last part of this study. For all these reasons, in no way should 
regulation be considered a mechanism that can be ruled out as a necessary step to 
internalise the negative externalities seen here.  
 
38 I therefore do not share the opinion of RODRIGUEZ FONT, M., “La regulació...”, op.cit. p. 
176. 
39 By way of example, let us imagine a soft drink company that pollutes a river whose water is 
drunk by a village’s inhabitants and, as a result, they are forced to pay for expensive bottled water 
(produced by another company); in this case, there is a clear negative externality, insofar as the 
first company’s actions give rise to a social cost that it does not bear, since it is not reflected in the 
price of the products that it manufactures, but rather it falls upon a third party – namely the 
inhabitants of the village. In such a situation, the externality would disappear if, for example, that 
company were to be obliged to pay a tax equivalent to the cost of contaminating the river, a cost 
that would surely be reflected in the price of the soft drinks that it produces. 
In the text, this example will be carried over to the section on urban environment and the right to 
the city. 
546




Be that as it may, what should be made clear is that far from being a technical 
decision (whether economic or juridical), the decision to internalise externalities, 
to undertake the process by means of Pigovian taxes, or through a rental right 
market, derived from the so-called Coase theorem, these are political and public 
policy decisions, which should be taken by the public authorities legally entitled to 
do so, including local government bodies inasmuch as they are responsible for 
regulating town-planning and housing.40 
It is, therefore, essential to have an efficient and flexible system of regulation, one 
that is adapted to the Collaborative Economy, which will have to consider the need 
for regulation and the contents of the same case by case, making use of mechanisms 
such as checklists, a tool for ex ante regulatory impact assessment.41  
4. HOW TO REGULATE: PRINCIPLES OF GOOD REGULATION AND BETTER OR 
SMART REGULATION FOR THE CE AND ACCOMMODATION 
As intervention is both necessary and possible, since there are powers of 
intervention and competences over different matters, it could be regulatory or 
otherwise. Without ruling out other alternatives, I believe that regulation (of 
different types, including the all-important town-planning regulation, as will be 
seen below) is required, as has already been stated. 
Such regulation will have to take into account the principles of better or smart 
regulation embodied at an international level by the OECD, at the European level 
by the EU, and at the Spanish and Catalan level by means of the principles of good 
regulation in articles 4 et seq. of the State Sustainable Economy Act of 2002, which 
have now been replaced by the principles of good regulation brought together in 
State Act 39/2015 on Common Administrative Procedure (PONCE, 2016). In 
addition, the provisions of legislation on transparency and good government, such 
as Catalan Law 19/2014, on transparency, information access and good government, 
which devotes a chapter to the improvement of regulatory quality and also affects 
ordinances and local plans, will have to be taken into account during its preparation. 
Thus, any such future regulation should have a suitable ex ante assessment process, 
as has already been pointed out, sufficient public consultation, and the necessary ex 
post assessment, which enable it to be as closely adapted as possible to the CE, 
allowing both innovation and flexibility, but protecting the substantial public 
 
40 See, for example, NAREDO, J.M., La economía en evolución, Siglo XXI de España Editores, 
Madrid, 2nd edition, 1996, pp. 266 et seq. 
41 Before taking the decision to regulate, a phase of reflection is advisable, for example on the 
basis of the checklist recommended by the OECD. 
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interests involved, in line with what RANCHORDAS has sustained in different 
studies. Twenty-first century phenomena cannot continue to be regulated with 
juridical techniques dating from the nineteenth century.   
Therefore, it is recommended that what are known as sunset clauses, or clauses 
with fixed time duration, should be adopted and, if possible, some experimentation 
should be undertaken before it comes into effect (e.g. sandboxes), in accordance 
with what is foreseen at present by, for example, the above-mentioned Catalan Law 
19/2014, in the section referring to good regulatory governance.42  
Among the principles of good regulation mentioned, this flexible, modern 
regulation would in particular have to respect the limit of the proportionality 
principle (very relevant in the European legal context), ensuring that its sub-
principles of appropriateness, adequacy and proportionality sensu stricto, well 
known and widely used in case law, are not violated. This means that it will be 
essential to define clearly the general interests pursued. Moreover, as has been 
pointed out, it is also necessary to select the least restrictive alternative for the rights 
of the owners and entrepreneurs linked with the CE, provided that it allows the 
general interests involved to be protected effectively, and to justify and to 
substantiate that the benefits of regulation are greater than its costs, with benefits 
and costs being understood in the widest sense (social, economic, environmental).  
Similarly, among these costs, the possible restrictions to the competition that may 
be generated will have to be weighed; this should not prevent regulation as long as 
it is necessary and appropriate.43 As the CNMC points out, regulations will be 
perfectly possible and valid, provided they comply with the principles of efficient 
economic regulation, that is to say, in many cases they may well be both necessary 
(there is a market failure that justifies a possible intervention to protect an 
overriding reason relating to the public interest) and proportionate (there are no 
 
42 Art. 64.4: “The Public Administration may promote pilot schemes prior to the approval of new 
regulatory measures in order to test their suitability. Such pilot schemes shall be applied by means 
of agreements signed with the bodies representative of the sectors involved, with the effects and 
conditions determined by the agreement”. 
On the need for smart regulation in the face of the collaborative economy: 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2015/may/20/smarter-regulation-for-the-
sharing-economy   
43 On this question, bear in mind as regards the town-planning sector the report of the Catalan 
Competition Authority “Recomendaciones sobre la regulación detallada de los usos del suelo 
desde la óptica de la competencia”, December 2014, available on-line at:   
http://acco.gencat.cat/web/.contento/80_acco/documentos/archivos/actuaciones/SE_8_2014_USO
S_DE EL_SOL_CAT.pdf     
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other alternatives that lead to smaller distortions in the market and allow public 
interest to be equally efficiently protected).44  
When analysing the land market in Spain, the CNMC itself recognises that town-
planning regulation is justified by market failures and public interest aims,45 a fact 
that is also recognised by the Catalan Competition Authority (ACCO) when it states 
that “town-planning is understood to be a necessary and advisable function.”46  
Moreover, in a report published at the end of 2016, with regard to the regulation of 
TAs, this body maintained, in line with the ideas expressed here, that: 
 “the ACCO is aware that this activity can lead to a series of externalities that, 
among others, might include: 
- nuisance to neighbours 
- “denaturalisation” at the district/city level  
- housing and rental price increases  
- increases in product prices  
- intensive use of infrastructure/anti-social behaviour 
Thus, the ACCO does not dismiss the possibility that externalities that might 
possibly justify the restriction of the activity may be present, but at all events such 
a reaction should be proportionate and represent the minimum possible distortion 
for competition, this being essential to contain these externalities at a level that is 
considered acceptable.”47 
 
44 Or in the words used literally by the CNMC, in the opposite sense, it can be the case that 
regulations “fail to match the principles of efficient economic regulation, that is to say, in many 
cases they are unnecessary (there is no market failure that might justify a possible intervention to 
protect an overriding reason relating to the public interest) or they are disproportionate (there are 
alternatives that generate fewer market distortions). This regulation limits competitive pressure in 
the markets and leads to a loss of well-being for society (higher prices, lower quality, less variety 
and less encouragement for innovation)”. 
45 CNMC, Problemas de competencia en el mercado del suelo en España, 2013 
46 AUTORIDAD CATALANA DE LA COMPETENCIA, Recomendaciones sobre la regulación 
detallada de los usos del suelo desde la óptica de la competència, 2014 
47 ACC, Una regulación dinámica en el ámbito del alojamiento turístico, December 2016, 
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Finally, the OECD has pointed out that “Land use restrictions often serve valuable 
social purposes.”48 
What these institutions and others remind us is simply that in each exercise of 
regulatory power, whether on town-planning or other matters, an evaluation of the 
impacts on competition should be included alongside other impacts when assessing 
ex ante during the drawing up of drafts of legislation, plans, ordinances and 
regulations. I use the word “remind” because this demand is naturally derived from 
the obligations arising from the right to good administration and from the legal 
principles of good regulation now included in laws 39 and 40/2015. 
It is therefore essential to incorporate, by legal mandate, a specific assessment of 
whether the regulation presents restrictions for competition (whether by limiting 
the number or range of market operators, or by limiting competition among 
operators, or by the reduction of incentives to compete) in the necessary evaluation 
of regulatory impacts carried out ex ante. 
If the answer is affirmative, it will be necessary to consider whether these 
restrictions are prohibited or not. If they are not, the following step will be to 
consider if they are required in order to pursue objectives of public interest (which, 
it should be stated, is already done when the test of proportionality is applied in the 
drawing up of the regulation, within its sub-principle of adequacy). If the answer is 
positive, the following question will be whether the restrictions are proportionate, 
in the sense that their benefits, in a broad sense, outweigh their costs (which 
overlaps with the proportionality principle, in its dimension as a sub-principle of 
proportionality sensu stricto). Finally, once the previous questions have been 
answered, it will be necessary to analyse whether or not there are any less restrictive 
alternatives that enable the public interest to be served equally efficiently (which is 
also carried out from the standpoint of the proportionality principle within its sub-
principle of necessity).49 
 
48 OECD, Policy Roundtables. Land Use Restrictions as Barriers to Entry, 2008, p. 7. 
49 On Competition advocacy and juridical norms, see: OCDE, Guía para evaluar la competencia 
(http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/reducingregulatoryrestrictionsoncompetition/39680183.pdf; 
EU: Better regulation: a guide to competition screening, 2005 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/legis_test.pdf ); COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE LA 
COMPETENCIA: Trabajando por la Competencia. Recomendaciones a las administraciones 
públicas para una regulación de los mercados más eficiente y favorecedora de la competencia, 
2008 
http://www.cnmc.es/Portals/0/Ficheros/Promocion/Guias_y_recomendaciones/recomendaciones.p
df ; Guía para la elaboración de Memorias de competencia, 2009 
http://www.cnmc.es/Portals/0/Ficheros/Promocion/Guias_y_recomendaciones/Guia%20para%20
Administraciones%20Publicas.pdf ; AUTORIDAD CATALANA DE DEFENSA DE LA 
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It should, thus, be noted that what is known as competitive impact analysis is, in 
fact, none other than the application of the proportionality principle bearing in 
mind only the impacts on competition, that is with a limited perspective. The correct 
application of the proportionality principle, including this type of impact, should 
already incorporate an analysis of competition, which the bodies responsible for 
overseeing tend to consider from what might be called the tunnel effect: they only 
consider this factor. However, competition should be contextualised with other 
negative and positive impacts in the assessment that has to be performed.  
Furthermore, it should also be kept in mind that all the assessment necessary to 
undertake the regulatory impact evaluation (including, but not exclusively, the 
impacts on competition) should be carried out for the sake of the obligations that 
the regulator has, derived from the citizens’ right to good administration, which 
requires careful consideration, with the due diligence and care, of all the facts and 
interests involved in decision-making, as European and Spanish jurisprudence and 
case-law have emphasised for many years. In addition, this assessment, a positive 
obligation, is independent of the application of the test of proportionality, to ensure 
that the limits of the latter, which are formulated in negative terms, not positively 
as are the obligations of good administration, are not exceeded.50 
It should be taken into account that, in regards to the establishment of what is least 
burdensome and ensuring that the benefits outweigh the costs, there is scope for 
discretion on the part of the regulator, which he or she is legitimately responsible 
for within the framework of a Democratic State of Law. In this kind of State, there 
is a constitutional functional distinction that prevents functional spheres from being 
invaded by certain powers in relation to others (as is concisely expressed, as regards 
the judicial power, by art. 71 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-
Administrativa (the Law regulating the Administrative Jurisdiction). 
Another prominent aspect of the regulation is its relation to the EU Services 
Directive. In view of the possible uncertainty that initially existed regarding the 
application of the Services Directive and the rules for transposition of the same to 
this matter (laws 17/2009 and 20/2013), it should now be pointed out that: 
- In principle, if the regulation deals with town-planning, this field is 
excluded from the above-mentioned Directive (see recital 9 of the same). In 
 
COMPETENCIA, Metodología para evaluar el impacto competitivo de las normas (EIC) 
http://acco.gencat.cat/web/.content/80_acco/documents/arxius/guia_aic_v17_08_10_final_esp.pdf  
50 PONCE SOLÉ, J. “Los jueces, el derecho a una buena administración y las leyes de 
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this respect, the Rulings of the High Court of Justice of Catalonia, no. 199 
of 2nd April 2014, no. 620 of 2014 of 5th November, and no. 431 of 16th 
July 2014, referring to the Plan of Uses for Ciutat Vella passed by the 
Barcelona City Council on 23rd July 2010. 
- However, it has been seen that art. 9.8 of the Catalan Town-planning law 
indicates that town-planning and building and land-use ordinances can 
establish constraints in regards to land use that involve restrictions on access 
to or the exercise of economic activities, provided that the principles and 
requisites established by the Services Directive are respected.  
Be that as it may, as regards the regulation not of the town-planning aspects but of 
the activity itself, this would be possible as long as it were motivated by overriding 
reasons relating to the public interest, as defined by the regulation in force51 and 
interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union, which include reasons 
of public order, public safety, public health, protection of consumers’ rights to 
health and safety, protection of the environment and the urban environment, and 
social policy objectives, among others. The ideas expressed above would thus allow 
both regional and municipal regulation to be based on overriding reasons relating 
to the public interest.   
In this respect, and insofar as municipal town-planning regulations are concerned, 
the Supreme Court Ruling of 19th October 2016 (cassation appeal no. 2625/2015) 
on the plan of uses for the town of Sabadell is of particular interest, endorsing the 
municipal regulation. As a consequence, it is perfectly possible for a town-planning 
regulation to protect important public interests for cities, limiting the use of TAs, 
provided that it is implemented in accordance with the principles of good regulation 
 
51 The Directive itself includes in recital 40 an open list of overriding reasons relating to the public 
interest and Recital 56 of the Services Directive states that: 
“(56) According to the case law of the Court of Justice, public health, consumer protection, animal 
health and the protection of the urban environment constitute overriding reasons relating to the 
public interest. Such overriding reasons may justify the application of authorisation schemes and 
other restrictions. However, no such authorisation scheme or restriction should discriminate on 
grounds of nationality. Further, the principles of necessity and proportionality should always be 
respected”. 
For its part, Law 17/2009 of 23 November, on free access to service activities and their exercise, 
provides a closed list of overriding reasons relating to the public interest, which in any case cannot 









mentioned above (in this respect, GARCÍA BERNALDO DE QUIRÓS, 2017, 23 
et seq.) 
5. THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF REGULATION OPEN TO THE CE IN THE 
ACCOMMODATION SECTOR IN SPAIN 
Finally, with regard to how this regulation should be articulated, the following 
possibilities (which may be concurrent rather than alternatives), at least, would be 
feasible: 
a) State regulations based on sections 149.1.1 SC and 149.1.18 SC and on other 
possible parts of the Constitution (remember the regulation for reasons of safety).  
b) Autonomous community regulations based on their competences in the fields of 
tourism and housing, as already exist in several Autonomous Communities. 
c) Municipal regulations based on their competences in the fields of town-planning, 
housing and tourism.  
I will focus on the last point. 
From the town-planning point of view, it should be remembered, for instance, that 
article 68.6 of the above-mentioned Catalan decree 159/2012 states that a dwelling 
may be used for tourism purposes if it is not prohibited by the regulation on uses in 
the sector where it is located or by the statutes of the (owners’) community duly 
inscribed in the Property Register in buildings subject to the Horizontal property 
regime.   
The possibilities that this regulation opens up are of interest, for instance those 
referring to the prohibition of this type of use in certain zones of the city, provided 
that the reason why is suitably justified (as is already done in New York and Berlin; 
it has been seen that there is no lack of reasons of public interest) or those that allow 
it, but consider it to be a modification of use (from residential to TAs) and linked 
to the existence of compensation for the use of premises of equal surface for 
housing purposes, as is the practice in Paris.  
It should, however, be noted that, unlike this case, in Catalonia and Barcelona, 
because of the town-planning law in force, changes in use of this type are not 
subject to licence, but rather to a declaration on the part of the person responsible, 
art. 187b is (in contrast, they are subject to this requirement, if they change to 
residential use …). If it was sought to establish a licence, it would be necessary to 
modify the law, a municipal ordinance alone not being sufficient. 
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This regulation could be developed by means of supra-municipal planning, such as, 
for example, in the Catalan case and more specifically in the Barcelona 
metropolitan area through the currently applicable General Metropolitan Plan of 
1976 or the future Town-planning Master Plan, or by means of a general urban 
development plan. 
In this context, the classification of uses established by planning could be further 
refined so as, in the first instance, to differentiate the use as a dwelling from other 
accommodation uses. The dwelling function should be restricted to use as the 
habitual place of residence for individuals, families and other units of co-existence 
in buildings (that is they should be the place of residence where the people involved 
are registered, they should occupy it for a period greater than 183 days per year, as 
stated by art. 2 of the State Land Act). That is to say, in order to avoid the negative 
impacts described, a town-planning regulation could take advantage of this 
classification to protect this urban use, prohibiting any others if necessary, which 
would provide a link with the concept of the home employed by the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights, which states that this is not autonomous, but 
rather it depends on factual circumstances, such as a tie with the dwelling.52 
Other accommodation uses that could be called residential uses would include 
those for purposes such as hotels, collective shared accommodation (care and 
nursing homes, old people’s homes, youth hostels, etc.) and tourist accommodation 
(hotels, guest houses, hostels, etc.), with this last category including TAs, since the 
substance of such residential uses, their reality and their impact are not the same as 
those of the previously mentioned uses for dwelling purposes.  
This distinction could be extended to professional activities carried out in the home 
(doctors, lawyers, etc.), second homes, and rooms within the dwelling rented for 
monetary compensation being recognised as falling in the category of dwelling. 
Because of its significance, this last possibility warrants somewhat more attention. 
It is clear that rooms in a dwelling being made available by the individual registered 
as the usual resident to a third party departs from the professionalised model and is 
closer to a relationship between equals, in which the non-professional owner 
obtains a return for a part of the dwelling, which is rented by persons belonging to 
the growing number of fellow citizens of constantly increasing age, who the crisis 
 
52 The case of ŠKRTIĆ v. CROATIA of 5th December 2013, citing other previous ones such as 
Buckley contra the United Kingdom, 25th September 1996,  Gillow contra the United Kingdom, 
24 November 1986, Wiggins v. the United Kingdom, no. 7456/76,  and Prokopovich v. Russia. 
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and the new property bubble have forced to live together.53 In this field, I consider 
that it is important to differentiate between service providers, who share time, goods, 
skills or knowledge, and do so on an occasional and non-professional basis, and 
who are understood to be peers or citizens, from service providers that act 
professionally.54  In this respect, it seems reasonable to include this possibility 
within the town-planning use of the dwelling and accept the use of rooms by third 
parties as comparable and equivalent. Needless to say, a limit to the number of 
rooms should be established so that this does not degenerate into a residential use 
for tourist accommodation (in other words, at the very least a guest house de facto, 
with all the negative effects that can easily be deduced). 
Once the distinction between a use as a dwelling and a residential use (which would 
include TAs) has been established, the next step would be to define the 
incompatibility of the two uses, prohibiting or restricting the latter in certain parts 
of the city (for instance only to the ground floor of apartment blocks), if it were 
necessary to protect all the public interests mentioned above, as long as this were 
carried out in accordance with the principles of good regulation by means of 
suitable assessment ex ante.  
Fundamentally, we would return to the essence of zoning (with its roots going back 
more than a century in Germany and the United States, where it is known as 
Euclidean Zoning, after the well-known ruling of the US Supreme Court in the case 
of Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)), since, as is 
self-evident, not all urban uses can be compatible in all situations. 
It is precisely the task of town-planning classification to protect major public 
interests such as those explained here, by dividing space into zones and preventing 
certain uses from being established alongside others in certain zones with good 
justification, or restricting such mixtures, among other reasons to make the 
“residential use in dwellings constituting habitual places of residence” possible, as 
 
53 See, for example, “Compartir piso no es solo para estudiantes”, El Periódico de Cataluña, 30th 
September 2017: http://archivo.elperiodico.com/ed/20170930/pag_030.html  
54 In this respect, for example, the Report of the Interdepartmental Commission on the 
Collaborative Economy of the Generalitat of Catalonia (September 2017) points out that these two 
different realities: the professionals (who often perform the activity, for profit and with a 
substantial amount of business) must have a set of regulations that ensures competition in terms of 
equality, regardless of the channels that they use, whereas private individuals need not carry out 
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is pointed out in art. 3.3 of the State Land Act.55 Rather than a violation of economic 
competition, this is what the very essence of town-planning administration should 
be seen as, as long as it is undertaken after due reflection and assessment, as has 
repeatedly been stated, a point to which I will return in a few lines.    
Because, as HUTCHINSON points out in an American Planning Association 
publication, tourist apartments and houses have similar uses to those of a dwelling, 
but they actually function more in line with commercial uses.56 
This is exactly what case law in the field of private relationships has repeatedly 
stated when it points out the difference between using an apartment as a habitual 
place to live and using it to carry out a “hotel-like” activity offering 
“lodgings/accommodation.”57 
 
55 By way of example, De GUERRERO MANSO, M.C., La Zonificación de la ciudad: Concepto, 
Dinámica y Efectos, Aranzadi, 2012. 
56 HUTCHINSON, N., “Short-Term Vacation Rentals: Residential or Commercial use?” Zoning 
News, March, 2002, p. 1. 
57 As the ruling of the Provincial Court of Barcelona of 9th October 2015, citing another of its 
rulings of 11th March 2010 reminds us:  <<Case law constantly proclaims that tourist apartments 
should be discontinued, because it is not a question of changing the use of commercial premises or 
a dwelling, but instead the insertion of a hotel business in a substantial part of a building mainly 
intended for private residential purposes, “excessive use” of the common infrastructure, for which 
the apartment block is not prepared, and which is none other than the reflection of the inevitable 
consequences of its industrial exploitation (Ruling of the Supreme Court of 22nd November 
2008); the change in purpose from commercial premises to tourist apartments should necessarily 
involve a modification to the foundational horizontal property title deeds, in order to adjust the 
participation percentages in the common expenses that all joint owners are obliged to pay (Ruling 
of the Provincial Court of Murcia 23/2007). Article 553-47 of the Catalan Civil Code states that 
“the owners and occupiers of apartments or commercial premises shall not, within their private 
space or in the rest of the property, undertake activities that the statutes prohibit, that are 
prejudicial for the building, or that contravene the general provisions concerning disturbing, 
unsanitary, noxious, dangerous or illicit activities”. >> 
For its part, the civil section of the Supreme Court, insists on the distinction between the use of a 
dwelling to live and other uses, from the perspective between private parties, but which, by pure 
logic, is extensible in general terms. Thus in the Ruling of 23rd November 2015: 
“Bearing that in mind, in this specific case, it does not appear that the idea that the apartments on 
the upper floors should be used as dwellings was used in the generic and usual meaning 
equivalent to apartment or singular flat, as is understood by the Court of First Instance, it cannot 
be forgotten that in the aforementioned notarial documents a clear and careful differentiation is 
drawn between apartment, with a generic meaning, and dwelling, a specific term and that it is the 
defendants themselves that when they, alone, grant the deed constituting the system for horizontal 
division specify that the use of the upper floors for dwellings, a term that, as  the Supreme Court 
Ruling of 2nd June 1970 states, in accordance with the official dictionary of the language means 
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Similarly, mention should be made of the possibilities of municipal ordinances, but 
also of the legal limits that presuppose that the matter must be regulated by an act 
of Parliament before an ordinance intervenes, a limit derived from section 53.1 of 
the Spanish Constitution in relation to sections 35 and 38 of the same document 
(the so-called legal reservation). This should not prevent municipal regulatory 
power, inherent in constitutionally recognised municipal autonomy, from 
regulating TAs without contradicting the existing legal framework, making use of 
its already mentioned competences, in the development of the criterion of local  
freedom to regulate respecting laws (the so-called “positive link”), as is pointed out 
by the Ruling of the Supreme Court  22/05/2015 Cassation Appeal number:  2433 
/ 2013.  
This also implies the possibility of categorising infringements and sanctions on the 
basis of articles 139 et seq. of the Ley de Bases de Régimen Local (Law regulating 
the Basis of Local Government) as regards whatever might be required for the 
protection of civic coexistence. 
6.  REGULATION AND FLEXIBILITY. IS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE A POSSIBLE 
ANSWER? FUTURE POSSIBILITIES FOR ALGORITHMIC REGULATION AND THE 
NIRVANA FALLACY 
In brief, while tourist apartments have positive features such as those alluded to, 
they give rise to negative externalities as well, also described. These latter aspects 
are the ones that require smart regulation, with appropriate ex ante and ex post 
assessment and with a degree of flexibility that one can endeavour to achieve in 
various ways, some of them put forward above. 
However, in the future one might envisage other regulatory techniques that might 
be called in real time, making use of the possibilities offered by technology. In that 
sense, the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) could be of interest. The market already 
offers this kind of solution as a part of the so-called smart city.58 Moreover, cities 
are beginning to use them as tools to manage TAs. This is the case of the city of 
 
dwelling, habitation, home, and that as it is grammatically established in the constituent 
document, the expression “used as a dwelling”, excludes any other function, unless in each 
specific case it can be combined, without altering the substance, with other additional activities. 
But furthermore, the lodging business that the defendants installed in the building involved in the 
lawsuit is far from being the accommodation of boarders in their own dwelling…”. 
58 See, for example, https://bismart.com/en/products-for/cities/  
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Barcelona, for example, which is using a web crawler, i.e. a search bot to detect 
tourist lets advertised on the various websites.59  
Thus, when looking into future developments to explore, the combination of  
algorithmic regulations, the use of big data and the possibility of establishing a 
publicly controlled market for transferring shared rights (which could be inspired 
by the well-known transfers of urban land use), derived from the so-called Coase 
“theorem”, mentioned above, could provide even greater flexibility, although 
within a framework of constantly increasing flexibility, as has been proposed by 
MILLER, translated to Spanish by LORA-TAMAYO, and other scholars, with 
regard to the specific case of London.60 
A system of this type would definitely offer flexibility but it would introduce a 
noticeable degree of complexity into the system and present practical problems of 
implementation, as has been pointed out by MILLER and, whatever the case, it 
would require sophisticated administrative regulation.  
Be that as it may, the use of artificial intelligence in connection with administrative 
decision-making in general and, more specifically, with regulation, what is known 
as algorithmic regulation or regulation by robot, is still in its initial stages, as is 
emphasised by COGLIANESE and LEHR in general and for the case of the United 
States,61 and even more so in the case of Spain.62 For this reason, at present it is 




60 See MILLER, Stephen R., “First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy”, Harvard 
Journal on Legislation 147 (2016). Available online at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2568016 , 
LORA TAMAYO, M., op.cit., and Quattrone, G., Proserpio, D., Quercia, D., Capra, L., and 
Musolesi, M. (2016, April). “Who benefits from the sharing economy of Airbnb?” In Proceedings 
of the 25th International Conference on World Wide Web (pp. 1385-1394). International World 
Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee. Available online at: 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~ucfamus/papers/www16_airbnb.pdf  
61 Coglianese, C., and Lehr, D. (2016). “Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in 
the Machine-Learning Era”. Geo. LJ, 105, 1147, available online at: 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e2d1/5f6b2bc234fa8df6eb986652adc7e3b10584.pdf  
62 Projects based on the use of big data are starting to be developed at the international level. In the 
tourism sector, the following web sites may be consulted: 
http://www.toscanapromozione.it/newsshow/showEvidenza/94/test; In general, see this initiative 
by the University of Chicago, http://dsapp.uchicago.edu/ which has opened a parallel European 
line https://dssg.uchicago.edu/europe/  
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the aim of serving the public interest and of avoiding the negative externalities 
described, on the basis of not using this kind of technology. 
It would not be appropriate to declare regulation to infringe established rights as 
there may be a less restrictive alternative for property owners’ rights; this is based 
on the possibility of a hypothetical algorithmic regulation with a transfer market of 
shared rights that might allow greater flexibility (an idea that has already been 
suggested by the ACCO in the aforementioned report published in 2016, even 
though rather vaguely and imprecisely). 
In legal terms, it should be kept in mind that proportionality in its dimension of 
necessity incorporates a discretional margin that cannot be renounced by the 
regulatory administration in order to decide which alternative actually serves the 
public interest hic et nunc within the practical, human and technical possibilities 
available at each moment, which cannot be replaced either by advisory 
administrative bodies or judicial ones. The obligations of good administration, 
linked with the due diligence or care, do not require an ideal solution, but rather the 
best possible one in the existing context; for this reason, this would be a case in 
which, to cite Voltaire, the best would (hypothetically) be the enemy of the good 
(what is feasible today), giving rise to a Nirvana fallacy, which is attributed to the 
economist DEMSETZ, in the sense that a logical mistake is made if real things are 
compared with unavailable alternatives, leading to a tendency to suppose that there 
is always a perfect solution for a specific problem.63 
By creating a false dichotomy that offers a clearly advantageous option – although, 
at the same time, non-existent in practical reality - the Nirvana fallacy can be used 
to attack any contrary idea as imperfect. The choice that it offers is not between 
real-world solutions, but between a realistic possibility and another, unreal solution 
that would be better. 
In juridical terms this would suppose an unconstitutional substitution by judges of 
the regulator’s discretionary power. 
A single absolute vision that competition should be defended therefore involves a 
clear risk of forgetting the serious impact of tourist apartments on the public interest 
and the technical and organisational administrative framework that really exists to 
protect it. Hence, when drawing up regulations and, when appropriate, during their 
 
63 H. Demsetz, “Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint,” Journal of Law and Economics 
12 (April 1969): 1, cited by Kirzner, Israel M. (1978). Competition and Entrepreneurship. p. 231. 
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subsequent monitoring, it is essential to take into account the necessary assessment 
of all the potentially affected relevant interests, not just some of them. 
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